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8.1  Introduction 
Economic historians will probably look back at the 1970s in Mexico as a 
puzzling  period  during which  the  “miracle”  of  the  1950s and  1960s was 
slowly transformed  into the “debt crisis” of  the 1980s. The figures are quite 
dramatic.  From  1954 to  1970, average annual GDP growth was 6.8%; the 
corresponding  figure for inflation 3.5%. By the end of  1970 the ratio of for- 
eign debt to GDP stood at 16.2.’ The period was also marked by improving 
real  wages:  urban  (rural)  wages grew  by 4.6% (4.7%). The next  18 years 
witnessed a dramatic reversal of these events: from 1971 to 1988 GDP growth 
averaged 4.1%, inflation 43%, urban (rural) wages 0.1% (2.0%);2  the foreign 
debt/GDP ratio stood at 77.5.  Equally important, the standard deviations of 
the growth and inflation rates during the former period are 0.019 and 0.04;  the 
corresponding figures for the latter period are 0.03 and 0.39. Macroeconomic 
performance was not only less satisfactory during the latter period, it was also 
more erratic. 
This paper centers its attention on the period 1970-82,  which we label one 
of “populist macroeconomic policies .”  These macro policies stand in contrast 
to those implemented during the “stabilizing development” of  the  1960s and 
the attempts  at macroeconomic  stabilization that followed  since  1983. Our 
purpose is not to provide yet another critique of the policies followed during 
that time. Rather, our aims are two: one, to understand  the origins of these 
Carlos Bazdresch is president of the Centro de lnvestigacion y Docencia Economicas. Santiago 
Levy is associate professor of economics at Boston University. 
The authors thank Enrique Cardenas, Sebastian Edwards, and Shane Hunt for comments on an 
earlier draft, as well as Dorothy Avery for her able work as research assistant. The usual disclaim- 
ers apply. 
1.  The figure relates to long-term debt only. 
2. The data for wages refers only to the period 1970-82;  see table 8.  I  below. 
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policies in Mexico and, two, to explain their economic effects. As the rest of 
the papers in this volume attest, the history of Latin America-and  Mexico is 
no exception-is  full of “populist episodes,” and so we wish to ask not only 
what these episodes consist of, but why they occur and what their short- and 
medium-term effects are. 
The term “populist” is used to refer to different regimes. Thus, the Car- 
denas presidency in Mexico is termed populist, but so is the Peronist regime 
in Argentina and the Vargas regime in Brazil. More recently, and despite sub- 
stantial differences with past experiences, the term populist is also applied to 
Allende’s regime in Chile, Echeverria’s and L6pez Portillo’s presidencies in 
Mexico,  and Garcia’s in  Peru.  The ideological differences among these re- 
gimes are large, as is the international context in which they take place. Per6n 
is considered to originate in the “military right,” while Allende was “on the 
left.” Cirdenas was consolidating the postrevolutionary  regime  in  Mexico; 
Allende intended to build socialism in Chile. 
If the term “populist” had a precise meaning it could clearly not be used to 
account for such diverse historical circumstances. Thus, its use as an analyti- 
cal category is both risky and dangerous; it may generate more heat than light. 
And yet, language may not betray us completely: there are some similarities 
in these  experience^.^ In economic policy they relate to the profligate use of 
public  expenditures,  the  intensive  use  of  price  controls,  systematic  over- 
valuation of the exchange rate, and uncertain policy signals with depressing 
effects on private investment. In politics they relate to the regime’s reliance on 
the support of workers’ and peasants’ organizations, which generally puts the 
regime in conflict with the country’s private sector. But, with the exception of 
Allende’s Chile, these conflicts are rarely absolute; moreover, the private sec- 
tor seems to survive them more often than the governments that provoke them. 
These similarities, nevertheless, are insufficient to distinguish populist from 
nonpopulist regimes.  Many other governments share the characteristics just 
mentioned. And the distinction, surely, cannot be made ex post on the basis 
of  which  regimes succeeded and  which did not; populism should not be a 
portmanteau category to describe any set of inconsistent policies. The ques- 
tion remains, Why does the adoption of a set of policies that many govern- 
ments use sometimes lead to the populist label? What is really meant by such 
label? 
3. Sheahan (1987, p. 316) writes that: “Populism is not merely the name for a disorder, but 
instead a fairly systematic manifestation of widely shared popular objectives.  . . . But some fea- 
tures are certainly common: dislike of the traditional elite dominance, of foreign investment and 
influence, of erratic and unfair market-determined prices for necessities, and of any appeal to the 
need for overall restraints on spending on social programs.  In the Latin American version they 
have all favored activist governments committed, at least verbally, to protection of workers and of 
wages, to industrialization, to nationalism, to policies of cheap food for urban consumers, and to 
favors for worthy groups as the norm and goal of good government. Rejection of efficiency criteria 
and of concern for macroeconomic balance became principles, not accidental byproducts” (em- 
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We  organize the paper in four sections. Section 8.2 analyzes the origins of 
populist policies in Mexico. Section 8.3 looks at the period of  stabilizing de- 
velopment. While it has been extensively analyzed before, we  nonetheless 
review it briefly, as it provides the background for the period under study. 
Section 8.4 describes the populist episodes of  1970-82,  dividing them, as 
seems natural in the Mexican context, into the six-year presidential terms (or 
sexenios) of Echeverria (1970-76)  and Lopez Portillo (1977-1982).  Section 
8.5 provides an assessment of  populist policies along with  concluding re- 
marks. 
8.2  Populist Economic Policies 
After  1910 Mexico experienced a long and violent revolution with strong 
nationalistic and popular overtones. The revolution took some time to consol- 
idate into a stable government, but  by  the end of  the  1930s this task was 
accomplished by  President Cirdenas through pacts with various popular or- 
ganizations,  chief  among them the peasants’ confederation (Confederacion 
Nacional Campesina, or CNC) and the workers’ central trade union (Central 
de Trabajadores de Mexico, or CTM).4 Through these pacts the government 
traded protection for the social interests represented by these organizations in 
exchange for political support. This network of  alliances, coupled with the 
previous emergence of  a single political party (Partido Revolucionario Insti- 
tucional, or PRI), maintained social peace for a long time, while at the same 
time keeping political power firmly in control of the government. 
Naturally, the leaders of  the revolution were very critical of  the previous 
regime. Among  many criticisms, two stood out: (i) the extreme misery  in 
which the majority of the population lived and (ii) the unwillingness or inabil- 
ity of the government to remedy this ~ituation.~  Two ideas derived from these 
criticisms were to play a major and persistent role in the emerging system. 
First is the idea that the country’s growth should not occur at the expense of 
basic popular rights.  In practice,  this was  interpreted to mean that bounds 
should be imposed on the operation of markets; limits to land ownership, pro- 
tection of  workers from the vagaries of  the labor market, and preclusion of 
foreign participation in the exploitation of natural resources. The second idea 
is that the government should be responsible for, and have the power to, im- 
pose the desired outcome. 
Thus, far from having only to “regulate trade and commerce and provide 
social peace,” the government born out of the Mexican Revolution had to be 
activist, “protecting” the lower-income classes and, more generally, pursuing 
distributive justice. Economic growth became one of the central raisons d’&tre 
4. See Meyer (1974), Ianni (1983), and Cordoba (1974) for further analysis of the Mexican 
5. Some argued, in addition, that the prior constitution-that  of  1857-imposed  too many 
political system and the Cardenist period. 
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of  the government,  as its political legitimacy derived from its ability to raise 
the standard of living of the population. To insure that growth had the desired 
characteristics, the government had an explicit mandate, enshrined in the con- 
stitution,6  to  intervene  in  the  economy.  This  was  manifested  in  various 
forms-first  through land redistribution,  and second in the control of  fiscal 
and monetary p01icy.~  Among other manifestations are, third, through the cre- 
ation  of  public  enterprises  in manufacturing,  transportation,  banking,  and 
other areas; fourth, through price controls for selected commodities; and fifth, 
through interventions in foreign trade and investment, labor legislation, credit 
policy, and the like. All this, in turn, had two key implications: first, the gov- 
ernment would be the central actor or protagonist in the economic life of the 
country. Second, the government would take the role of referee or mediating 
agent, balancing the conflicting demands of workers, peasants, and entrepre- 
neurs. And government,  in the Mexican context, meant the executive branch, 
as a strong presidential regime was another key characteristic of the political 
arrangements set by the 19 17 Constitution. 
With growth as a priority, the government had to develop a special alliance 
with entrepreneurs (or the private sector), as the latter controlled the supply of 
capital and entrepreneurial ability. And, while the private sector was formally 
out of  the PRI, the government  nonetheless created the conditions for it to 
flourish:  fiscal  policy,  labor laws,8 trade  protection,  and  other instruments 
were chosen to enhance the profitability  of private investment. In exchange, 
the private sector would not directly challenge the government’s monopoly on 
political power. Still, the private sectors’ support for the government was less 
forthcoming than that of workers’ or peasants’ organizations.  At the root of 
the arrangement  lay a fundamental  asymmetry: while workers and peasants 
were not, on the whole, internationally mobile, the opposite was true of capi- 
tal. Hence the greater bargaining power of the latter group vis-a-vis the gov- 
ernment. 
A necessary condition for the government to perform effectively its role as 
leading agent of growth and referee of social conflict is that it be powerful. 
Economic policy, broadly defined, would be a pillar of this power. Thus, the 
principle  emerged  that  economic  policy  could-and,  when  necessary, 
should-be  used  in  the  pursuit  of  the  government’s  political goals. These 
goals could be distributive,  though this was not always the case. But regard- 
6. See in particular Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution,  where reference is made to the 
“Rectorship of  the State” in economic affairs. 
7. The Central Bank-Banco  de Mexico-was  founded in 1925, but was not designed to func- 
tion as a truly autonomous institution. The director of the bank is either confirmed or appointed 
by  the president, who has the power to renew his term in office. The director is responsible to the 
Board of Governors headed by the minister of finance. 
8. We note, however, that there were at times important differences between the formal labor 
laws and their implementation. Although the letter of  the law placed great emphasis on workers’ 
rights,  these were at times suppressed by  a combination of  trade union corruption and outright 
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less of  whether government  interventions had distributional intentions,  they 
always had a parallel goal: to strengthen the political power of the government 
through its control of economic activities. Many forms of government action 
therefore had this double role. The ejido, for example, was a mechanism to 
distribute land to peasants and impose bounds on land ownership, but it was 
also an institution that tied the loyalties of ejiduturios to the g~vernment.~ 
The large role given to the government in the economy, as well as the limits 
imposed on the free operation of markets, created an inherent conflict between 
the government and markets; this conflict reflected a deep-seated distrust in 
market operation.lo We  see two reasons that  account for it. First,  we know 
that,  for given  preferences  and  technology,  income distribution  is  strongly 
determined  by  the size and distribution  of productive assets.  In Mexico’s 
case the distribution of productive assets has been highly concentrated. Thus, 
the undiluted action of market forces, barring any government action, would 
probably generate a very skewed distribution of income. This outcome would 
be incompatible with the ideals of the revolution: too much economic power 
would be concentrated in few social groups. 
Second, distributional problems aside, the requirements for market forces 
to produce efficient outcomes are very  strong; incomplete markets for risk, 
costs, and asymmetries in the availability of  information, increasing returns, 
and  other  nonconvexities  imply  that  market  equilibrium  are  Pareto- 
suboptimal.’*  Although not articulated in this language, it is probably the case 
that these factors played a large role in the thinking of some revolutionaries, 
who felt the need for mechanisms to achieve more equitable and efficient out- 
comes than what the markets of  that time delivered; it was believed that the 
government could do better.  I3 Thus, the set of laws and regulations that gave 
9. For example, neither ejidos as a whole nor individual ejiduturios are allowed to offer land as 
collateral, thus limiting any access to credit from private sources; credit is offered to the ejido as a 
whole by public-sector institutions. 
10. Sheahan (1987, p. 319) has put the matter aptly: “The low popularity of free-market eco- 
nomics in Latin America is not evidence that radicals have misled the people: the majority of the 
public is probably no more confused about what they want and why than the rest of us are. It is 
rather that the conviction runs deep that market-oriented economic strategies are likely to maintain 
special privilege,  work adversely for the poor, impede industrialization,  and strengthen foreign 
influence.” 
11. This point has generated some misunderstandings. For instance, Cordera and Tell0 (1989, 
p. 82) think neoclassical theorists claim that “the free interplay of market forces . . . would insure 
the best and fairest distribution of income between the various classes that participate in the pro- 
duction of  goods and services” (our translation and emphasis). In fact, no such claim is made. 
12. A long tradition  in  development economics-associated  with the names of  Rosenstein- 
Rodan, Hirschman, Scitovsky and others-can  be interpreted as dealing with these issues. See 
Stiglitz (1988) for a modem rendition of the arguments and Bardhan (1988) for a particularly 
illuminating discussion of alternative approaches to development economics. We note, as Bardhan 
does, that “the differences between the more sophisticated versions of  alternative approaches, 
even though substantial, are narrower than is generally perceived’ (Bardhan 1988, p. 40). 
13. From a welfare-theoretic  point of  view, of  course, the presence of  market failures is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition to justify government intervention. For the latter, it is nec- 
essary to show that, given the government’s information and administrative capacity, such inter- 228  Carlos Bazdresch and Santiago Levy 
power to the government to intervene in the economy had, aside from the 
political considerations mentioned above, a separate origin. 
As many historians have pointed out, not all revolutionaries were in favor 
of this role for the government. A subset of them argued that Mexico’s growth 
should be based on the development of  markets and free enterprise. Hence, 
the Constitution of  1917 embodies these two visions. From this difficult co- 
habitation inconsistent laws and policies have emerged on more than a few 
occasions. For our purposes, however, the key point is this: given Pareto sub- 
optimal equilibriums and skewed distributions of  productive assets, the issue 
is not whether the government will intervene, but with what policies. Risking 
oversimplification, we  distinguish two  types of  interventions. On the one 
hand are those that try to alleviate market failures or improve the distribution 
of income by  means that do not interfere with price signals but pay attention 
to the resulting incentive structure.14  On the other are those-which  we label 
populist-that  implicitly or explicitly disregard resource constraints, the in- 
formational content of prices, and the reaction of agents to the incentive struc- 
ture and attempt to replace markets by direct government allocations. 
The combination of  three conditions creates the background for populist 
policies in Mexico: (1) an activist government born out of a revolution with a 
mandate to intervene and a desire to do so to pursue its political goals; (2) 
market failures and distributional considerations that create a need for govern- 
ment intervention; and (3) the appeal associated with interventions that sup- 
press markets or try to allocate by other means. Thus, the potential for popu- 
list interventions is a phenomenon rooted in the political institutions dominant 
in Mexico since 19  17. 
It  should be  clear from this description that populist interventions should 
not always be seen as the response of “the constrained referee of  social con- 
flict” to inconsistent demands by various social groups. This view ignores the 
second objective of  government’s intervention in the economy: that is, to re- 
main  in political control.  Even when  distributional conflict is not at center 
stage, governments may engage in populist policies if they believe that by 
doing so they can diminish the political power of certain groups. In contrast 
to what Dornbusch and Edwards (1989) and Sachs (1989) argue is the case for 
Latin America, in Mexico the primary cause for populist policies has not al- 
ways been social pressures arising from inequality. 
Of course, interventions by governments never take a pure form: in almost 
every regime there is a mix  of  market-oriented and populist policies. This 
creates a need to make a distinction between populist policies and populist 
vention will increase welfare.  Put differently, it is necessary to show that those responsible for 
designing and implementing government policy have the ability (and incentives) to make credible 
and consistent (social) welfare improving interventions. 
14. By incentive structure we mean here the set of current and expected future relative prices 
(and possibly quantity constraints) that agents, given the information at their disposal, use to make 
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episodes. We argue that populist economic episodes occur when populist pol- 
icies come to the fore and, more particularly, when the mix of macroeconomic 
policies tilts strongly in the populist direction. Thus, all regimes have “popu- 
list features” in the sense that to some extent they all engage in populist poli- 
cies. A combination of political circumstances, external shocks, and individ- 
ual personalities determines when populist policies cease to be pecata minutia 
and instead dominate the bulk of macroeconomic policies taken by the gov- 
ernment, that is, when populist episodes occur. Of these three, political cir- 
cumstances occupy a central role:  the government  might  find  it  expedient 
to resort to populist policies to accommodate the demands of certain groups, 
to increase  its  legitimacy,  to solve  a political  crisis, or to bypass or post- 
pone structural reforms. Alternatively,  the government may implement a par- 
ticular populist policy in an attempt to reassert political control. External con- 
ditions also matter,  however,  as access to external  borrowing,  and/or terms 
of  trade  shocks, and/or swings in the rate of growth of the world economy 
have  important domestic repercussions. An elastic  supply of  foreign credit 
is  a  precondition  for a  large  buildup of  debt.  A  government  tempted  to 
populist actions might find them irresistible in the event of  a positive terms 
of  trade  shock.  Conversely,  a negative  terms of  trade  shock  coupled,  say, 
with an inelastic supply of foreign credit might preclude a government from 
engaging  in  populist  policies,  even  if  it  was  predisposed  to  do so.  The 
government in  Mexico plays the leading role in the economy; it does not 
control external events. Finally,  personalities  also matter, particularly  in the 
short run, given the strong concentration of political power in the executive 
branch. 
Thus, given the potential for populist policies that is always present, popu- 
list episodes result from the interaction  of a complex set of  events.  Because 
these  policies can yield  short-run benefits,  there  is  always a temptation  to 
engage in them. Because they do favor certain groups (although not necessar- 
ily, nor always, the poor), they create political constituencies that support and 
encourage them. Because their implementation  may at times be easier or po- 
litically more viable (e.g., raising revenues through the inflation tax or foreign 
borrowing rather than through a tax reform), governments may opt for them. 
And  because there  might  be  a belief  that  they can alter the distribution  of 
power in the society, governments may at times feel that they have no other 
option than to resort to them. 
In Mexico’s postrevolutionary  history  there have been two main populist 
episodes. The first occurred during the CCdenas administration (1934-40),  a 
period during which (i) land redistribution  was extensive, (ii) the corporatist 
nature of the political system was consolidated, (iii)  large numbers of public 
enterprises were formed, and (iv)  oil resources were nationalized. The second 
populist  episode occurred during the presidencies  of  Echeverria  and Lopez 
Portillo. These two episodes are very different, and it is probably misleading 
to use the same adjective to refer to both. In any case, we emphasize that, in 230  Carlos Bazdresch and Santiago Levy 
this paper, we deal only with the second one. Before we turn there, however, 
one additional remark is necessary. 
While governments in Mexico have great leeway to intervene in the econ- 
omy, they are all bound to follow, at least in principle, the ideology of the 
Mexican Revolution. This ideology emphasizes, among other things, the no- 
tions of economic nationalism and a mixed economy (Cordoba 1973). But 
these notions are sufficiently vague to allow for various interpretations, giving 
governments enough space to stress this or that particular interpretation of the 
mixed economy, or of economic nationalism, as the conditions of  the time 
require.  Nevertheless,  specific  economic  policies  cannot  be implemented 
without recourse to some economic justification. When governments follow 
orthodox macroeconomic policies, their rhetoric emphasizes fiscal prudence. 
In  these circumstances governments borrow freely, but selectively, from or- 
thodox  economic  theory.  Conversely,  when  populist  policies  are  imple- 
mented,  the rhetoric emphasizes nonorthodox  approaches. Governments in 
Mexico are not committed to (nor do they strictly follow) a narrowly defined 
economic philosophy. In our view, it is misleading to identify populist eco- 
nomic policies with a specific school of economic thought, whether Marxist, 
structuralist,  or  otherwise.  Rather,  these  ideas  are  pragmatically  invoked 
when it is necessary to justify a particular action taken by the government in 
pursuit of its political  interests. To  the extent that structuralist ideas do not 
emphasize the relationship between budget deficits and inflation, for instance, 
these ideas are welcomed, nay solicited, by the government to justify its use 
of deficit finance. (Whether budget deficits do or do not cause inflation is a 
separate matter.) And while Marxist and/or structuralist ideas can be invoked 
and incorporated into the populist rhetoric, they are rarely applied in a pure 
form. It is futile to look for consistency between, say, structuralism and the 
economic policy of a particular regime. This implies, in turn, that the analysis 
of populist economic policies is not synonymous with the analysis of a partic- 
ular school of thought. Economists might place great emphasis on purity of 
thought, consistency, and rigor. Mexican governments have been historically 
less inclined to do so and have consumed theories and ideas from a wider 
menu. 
8.3  A Glimpse at Stabilizing Development 
Stabilizing  development-the  period  running  from  the  mid- 1950s  to 
1970-was  characterized by very  low inflation and nominal exchange rate 
stability. After  an initial interlude of  mildly falling real wages in the mid- 
1950s, the next decade experienced the opposite phenomenon: real urban (ru- 
ral)  wages  rose,  on  average,  6.6% (6.7%).15  In  addition,  real  per  capita 
15. Data on real wages in Mexico should be interpreted with caution, as different sources give 
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growth was positive and steady. Such a simultaneous occurrence of events had 
never been experienced before, nor has it been observed since. 
The core element of macroeconomic policy was the control of  inflation, a 
sine qua non for exchange rate stability in an economy with full capital mobil- 
ity.  Low inflation was basically produced by tight control of public finances; 
small budget deficits were financed with moderate growth of external borrow- 
ing (cf. tables 8.1 and 8.2).  Small budget deficits, in turn, were the outcome 
of tight fiscal expenditures, not high taxes.16 Tax policy was instead used to 
promote private investment and grant subsidies to selected sectors and com- 
modities (energy, food, transportation) via the pricing policies of public enter- 
prises.  Low  inflation  and low inflationary expectations  along with  credible 
exchange rate policies induced asset holders to invest in domestic assets, both 
physical and financial. A savings rate growing jointly with positive domestic 
real interest rates increased substantially the degree of financial intermedia- 
tion during the period.” The same was true of private investment in real capi- 
tal.  Capital  flight-a  phenomenon  that would  plague the economy  in later 
years-was  mostly  absent. In  addition,  the  international  environment  was 
also conducive to growth. 
The orthodox management of aggregate public finances, the exchange rate, 
and interest rates contrasts with the nonorthodox management of  many other 
aspects of  economic policy.  First,  protective  trade  policies associated  with 
import  substitution  industrialization  resulted  in a strong “domestic bias”  of 
the trade regime. Industry grew behind a combination of import permits, quo- 
tas, and tariffs. The trade regime did increase the share of industry in GDP, 
but also induced tariff-jumping direct foreign investment and inefficiencies in 
industries where the domestic market was insufficient to exploit economies of 
scale. It also created  opportunities  for rent-seeking  activities,  and  it was a 
major factor (together with tax and credit regulations) in the creation of  oli- 
gopolistic industrial  structures; the resulting increases in price-cost  margins 
probably had a regressive effect on income distribution. 
Second, agricultural  growth slowed considerably as the extensive margin 
was reached  and the easy  irrigation projects  completed  (Yates 1981). This, 
together  with  price  controls on key  agricultural  goods, food, housing  and 
transport subsidies for the urban workers,  and protective tariffs on industrial 
products,  altered the terms of  trade in favor of  the urban-industrial areas.lS 
Growth had, in the language of Lipton (1977), a strong “urban-bias.” Third, 
the pricing policies of public enterprises in key areas of  oil, electricity, trans- 
16. Hansen (1974, p. 114) argues that, when  account is taken of  all sources of  government 
revenue (including social security taxes), Mexico’s tax effort in 1965 ranked among the lowest of 
Latin American countries, with a total  tax  coefficient of  10.4%.  compared to  Brazil’s 30.4%. 
Chile’s 25.8%.  and Argentina’s 18.9%. 
17. The ratio M3/GDP increased from 0.28 in  1960 to  0.51 in  1970. 
18. For example, the real price of corn and wheat fell by 6.4%  and 22.8%  between 1960 and 
1970; see Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos Hidralicos (1983). Table 8.1  Basic Macroeconomic Indicators 
Inflation Rates  Real Wage Indicesc 
GDP Growth  Per Capita 
Ratea  Growth Ratea  WPI for Mexico City  CPI for Nation 
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37.8  39.5 
37.0  39.0 
36.4  37.7 
43.8  42.8 
52.9  52.6 
62.6  54.9 
67.7  70.3 
75.4  77.5 
79.1  81.1 
81.6  83.6 
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Sources: GDP and inflation rates: Indicatores Economicos, Banco de Mexico; for rural and urban real wage indices, 1955-83,  Gregory (1986); for minimum real 
wage index,  1970-88;  CIDE, Economia Mexicana; for total foreign debt: Macroasesoria,  Inc. 
'1955-80  in 1970 prices; 1980-88  in  1980 prices. 
c1978 = 100. 
1954-75  data are two-year averages. 
'In  the period between 17 September and 31 December  1973, the index for rural and urban minimum wages is 86.2 and 88.3, respectively. In the period between 
I January and 7 October 1974, the index for rural and urban minimum wages is 87.3 and 89.4, respectively. 
'Effective 8 October 1974 to 31 December 1975. 
$In the period between  1 October and 31 December  1976, the index for rural and urban minimum wages is 104.5 and 107.3, respectively. 
hIn  the period between  1 November and 31 December  1982, the index for rural and urban minimum wages is 92.8 and 80.9, respectively. 
'In the period between June 1st and December 31st.  1983, the index for rural and urban minimum wages is 77.0 and 67.2, respectively. 
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Table 8.2  Indicators for Public Finance (% of GDP): 



























Revenues  Expenditures 
Total  Oil  Total  Currenta  Capital  Interest 
18.0  . . .  18.8  ...  ...  ... 
17.3  . . .  18.4  ...  ...  ... 
17.5  . . .  19.7  ...  ...  .. 
17.7  . . .  19.6  ...  ...  ... 
18.1  . . .  20.0  ...  ...  ... 
18.9  . . .  22.4  ...  ...  ... 
18.4  3.0  20.5  14.6  4.3  1.6 
18.7  2.8  22.9  15.4  5.7  1.8 
20.2  2.6  25.8  17.0  7.0  I .8 
21.1  3.4  27.0  17.9  7.2  1.9 
23.2  3.3  31.9  21.0  8.6  2.3 
23.8  3.3  32.0  20.7  8.0  3.3 
24.6  3.8  30.0  19.3  7.6  3.1 
25.9  4.5  31.4  19.5  8.7  3.2 
26.7  5.6  33.0  19.5  9.8  3.7 
26.9  7.3  33.5  19.8  9.6  4.1 
26.7  7.3  39.7  21.4  12.9  5.4 
28.9  9.9  44.5  25.1  10.2  9.2 
32.9  14.2  41.0  20.7  7.5  12.8 
32.2  13.0  38.8  20.7  6.1  11.4 
31.2  11.5  39.2  21.1  6.1  12.0 
30.3  9.0  44.8  21.5  6.0  17.3 
30.6  9.8  45.0  19.5  5.6  19.9 



























Sources: Data for 1977-88;  Indicadores Economicos,  Banco de Mexico; data for 1965-76;  Di- 
reccion General de Planeacion Hacendaria, SHCP; Financial deficit, 1965-70:  Gil Diaz and Ra- 
mos (1988). 
’Excluding interest payments. 
bThe  financial deficit includes also “financial intermediation” expenditures, so that it is not equal 
to the difference between total revenues and total expenditures. 
portation,  and food  were used  not only as mechanisms to promote private 
investment and turn the terms of trade against rural Mexico, but also as sig- 
naling devices for inflation control: insofar as these prices were nominally 
constant inflationary expectations would be reduced and the credibility of  the 
exchange  rate  enhanced.  Nevertheless,  the  resulting  structure  of  relative 
prices induced distortions in  the use  of  intermediate inputs and  indirectly 
channeled subsidies to high income groups.Ig  Fourth, price controls were also 
19. Levy (1988) develops a model to trace through the effects of  public-sector prices on the 
distribution of  income, showing that  generalized  price  subsidies are a  very expensive way  of 
helping the poor, as these subsidies spill over into higher income groups that consume a significant 
share of  the subsidized products. 235  Populism and Economic Policy in Mexico 
applied to important commodities  produced by the private sector. Thus, the 
nominal prices of wheat, corn, tortillas, bread, and sugar, as well as of urban 
transport,  electricity,  and other services were left unchanged throughout the 
sixties. This aimed at reinforcing the nominal stability of prices, but produced 
a rigid  structure of relative prices and, at times, squeezed profit margins in 
some private  firms.Zo  Stability of  nominal prices,  particularly the exchange 
rate, were almost an end in itself. Yet a fifth characteristic is associated with 
public expenditures. A low tax coefficient made little room for social expend- 
itures (see table 8.3). Serious deficiencies in the provision of health and edu- 
cation ensued precisely at a time when the rate of growth of population was 
accelerating. This phenomenon, together with a highly skewed distribution of 
income,*’ was an important ingredient of the political  crisis that was under 
gestation toward the end of the 1960s. 
In  sum,  stabilizing  development  brought  about  sustained  growth, but  a 
gamut of structural problems lurked behind the screen of price and exchange 
rate  stability:  agricultural  stagnation,  inward-biased  industrialization,  re- 
gional disparities and urban bias, and insufficient attention to income distri- 
bution and poverty. The strategy generated growth, but at increasingly higher 
costs. As the period  came to an end, trade and exchange rate policy  were 
turning  more  incompatible,  real  wage  increases  in  excess  of  productivity 
growth threatened  price  stability,  while restrictive  government expenditures 
generated social problems. Even those responsible for economic policy during 
the period  emphasized the fragility of the macroeconomic balance,  and the 
difficulties of recuperating it if it was ever lost.Z2  Thus, it is fair to say that, in 
1970 the economy was in need of reform, although the reforms required were 
mostly microeconomic in nature. And while this can be said with the benefit 
of  hindsight, a clear awareness of the difficulties inherited did not exist at that 
time. 
20. A side effect of this policy would be the need to ‘nationalize’ private firms that could no 
longer produce profitably at the given prices. This was, for example, the case for sugar mills. 
21. It  is difficult to make comparisons in the pattern of income distribution overtime, as the 
Lorenz curves for the years for which income-expenditure surveys are available cross. After mak- 
ing various corrections and using alternative measures of inequality, Aspe and Beristain (1984b. 
p.  54) conclude  that: “Whatever measure  of  inequality is observed and whatever indicator of 
relative position is used, whether income or expenditure,  the main conclusion . . . is that the 
income  distribution  structure  of  the country  remained  basically unaltered  between  1950 and 
1977.” Note that while income shares have been mostly time invariant, at any pint  in time the 
distribution is highly unequal.  For 1977 we find that the poorest decile of  the population earned 
1.2% of all income, while the richest received 42% (Aspe and Beristain 1984b. p. 38). On the 
other hand, during stabilizing development: (i)  the absolute income levels of the lowest deciles 
increased and  (ii) grew faster than during any other period. Thus, while income inequality was 
pronounced,  there were substantial improvements in the welfare levels of the poor; poverty and 
inequality are distinct phenomenons. 
22. Ortiz Mena, finance minister during the period  1958-70,  and generally recognized as the 
chief architect of stabilizing development, pointed out the need for policy changes in his classic 
article published at the end of the period (see Ortiz Mena 1970). Table 8.3  Indicators for Public Finance (in Constant PricesP 
Growth 
Total  Rate 
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14.9  28,362 
19.1  38,056 
11.8  41,578 
24.4  52,715 
2.9  50,553 
-3.6  49,874 
9.3  61,879 
9.2  75,932 
14.8  84,487 
16.4  122,124 
16.7  95,609 
-  22.0  66,824 
-  .5  61,284 
9.0  57,384 
-1.2  55,319 
-  10.6  50,419 
-7.9  39,522  - 
Sources: Data for 1977-88:  Indicadores Economicos, Banco de Mexico; Data for 1965-76:  Direccion de Estadisticas Hacendarias, SHCP. 
'Current  price data is deflated by the GDP implicit price index (1970 = 100). 
bDoes  not include tax revenue from PEMEX. 
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8.4  Populist Economic Episodes 
8.4.1  The Echeverria Regime 
Change was the distinctive feature of Echeverria’s presidency. Foreign pol- 
icy took a more active role and tilted in favor of Third World interests (Green 
1977). The political management of  the country changed: political reforms, 
which continue to this day, were initiated (Middlebrook 1986). Political style 
and rhetoric were different.23  Economic policy also changed. The cautious 
approach to macroeconomic management was abandoned as the government 
began  to use public expenditures and other instruments more aggressively. 
Why did economic policy change paths? What objectives were being pur- 
sued? What was accomplished by the change? 
To understand Echevern’a’s motives we must begin by recalling the political 
crisis  that  characterized  Mexico  in  1970 and  its  connection to  the  1968 
student-led protests and subsequent repression. Two  factors were dominant: 
(1) the erosion of the government’s political legitimacy and (2)  the possibility 
of a guemlla movement developing at a time when leftist ideology was signif- 
icantly more important in Latin America than it is today.  These two factors 
placed the need for political action at the top of the agenda; economic prob- 
lems took a secondary role. Echevem’a signaled throughout his election cam- 
paign his wish for a negotiated solution to the political crisis; his desire for 
eschewing repression stemming, at least in part,  from a desire to avoid in- 
creasing the role played by the military. 
A politically moderate government like the Mexican one sought a negoti- 
ated solution to the political crisis. This was difficult since a new element was 
present: to incorporate the left into the political system real concessions had 
to be made, yet at the same time it was important that the actions taken by the 
government not give the impression that  the country would turn  socialist, 
given fears of alienating the right.  These factors reduced the government’s 
space for finding a solution. Yet, barring some members of the private sector, 
a consensus appeared that the political crisis should be tackled by more “state 
activism.” This “return to the  state” was  strongly advocated by  the leftist- 
leaning intellectuals whom Echevem’a had recruited from the national univer- 
sity (UNAM), and other places, into his circle of advisers. These intellectuals 
had long criticized the government for “betraying” its popular and revolution- 
ary origins and surrendering to capitalism for the sake of rapid growth. More 
state activism, however, was  also advocated by other economists not identi- 
fied with leftist ideologie~.~~  These economists coincided with those on the 
23. The rhetoric was different not only in its emphasis, hut also in its amount: observers hesi- 
tated between labeling the president a demagogue or a preacher (Cosio Villegas 1973). 
24. For example, D. Iharra, L. Solis, V.  Urquidi, and even Ortiz Mena recommended an in- 
crease in public expenditures in order to most effectively meet the various social needs. And while 
they also advocated the simultaneous need for increasing government revenues, the general mes- 
sage was  for more state intervention (see Ibarra et al.  1972). One should also recall that the 238  Carlos Bazdresch and Santiago Levy 
left in signaling unequal income distribution, or at least widespread poverty, 
as a central problem. 
In short, at the beginning of  the Echeverria regime, informed opinion fa- 
vored stronger use of the government’s capacity to intervene in the economy 
to reduce poverty, increase public investment in areas where private invest- 
ment  was  not  forthcoming,  and  reduce  the  importance of  foreign firms. 
Among the many promises that Echeverria made in his inaugural speech two 
stood out: political reform and changes in economic policy to reduce poverty. 
The announcement of political reform was accompanied by  a clear message: 
the government would lean in the direction of  those who advocated a more 
democratic and open system; the “apertura democratica” signaled substantial 
change. The same was not true of economic policy; while reducing poverty 
and income inequality were announced as objectives, the means by  which 
this would be attained were not clearly specified. Thus it was announced that 
low inflation and nominal exchange rate stability remained as targets along 
with  real wage increases.  The mixed economy and the “nationalist” busi- 
nessman were praised, but stem criticisms were made of  the business com- 
munity.  And  while affirming that “free enterprise can only render fruit if 
the government has sufficient resources to coordinate the fulfillment of  the 
great national objectives,” Echeverria’s inaugural address made no referen- 
ces to taxes. 
The promise of reduced income inequality, therefore, was and was not an 
important goal of the unspecified changes in economic policy. It was impor- 
tant to  the extent that it was  obviously desired. It was unimportant to the 
extent that there was a simultaneous promise that everything, or almost every- 
thing, would remain the same. The abundance of  promises suggests that the 
government intended to neither commit itself to a particular policy, nor waive 
its right to any policy. Today, with the benefit of  hindsight, what Echeverria 
had in  mind appears clear: that economic policy should henceforth obey the 
needs of the government, not those of the private sector. Put differently, Ech- 
everria had a new attitude to economic policy, not a new solution to the prob- 
lems of policy. So we find here tinges of  populism or, if you will, evidence of 
a “voluntaristic” attitude toward the economy: willing change without provid- 
ing solid means for it. In any event, after more than a decade of  stabilizing 
development, the government’s leading role in the economy took a new turn 
in 1971: shared development had amved. 
The world economy also changed in important ways in  the early  1970s. 
Two  such changes were important for Mexico. One, higher world inflation 
contributed,  through import prices,  to increase domestic inflationary pres- 
sures. Two, the 1973 oil shock enlarged substantially the country’s access to 
international finance, as the world capital markets sought outlets for the large 
substantial economic literature criticizing import substitution industrialization appeared later on 
(e.g.,  the influential OECD study by Little, Scitovsky, and Scott 1975). The benefit of  hindsight 
makes many things obvious now, not then. 239  Populism and Economic Policy in Mexico 
petrodollar deposits. Private capital flows became a more important source of 
external savings.25 
Shared development  inherited a stable macroeconomic  environment with 
unstable  microeconomic  foundations.  Microeconomic  reforms,  however, 
were not on the agenda. Although 1971 experienced a deceleration in growth, 
it was more the result of the standard slowdown in spending associated with a 
change in administration than of tight fiscal policy aimed at holding back in- 
flation and reducing a growing trade deficit. The stated aims of policymakers 
were to preserve price stability and the fixed exchange rate, while at the same 
time augmenting social spending and accelerating growth to increase employ- 
ment.26  The government took the lead in promoting such growth, and in 1972 
substantially increased both public expenditures and domestic credit: the for- 
mer increased by 21.2% in real terms in that year, the latter by 7.9%. Yet  the 
key fact about the expansion of government spending was that it occurred in 
the absence of  a significant tax reform.27  While at the beginning of the admin- 
istration the sales tax rate was increased by  1%, this was insufficient to cover 
the added spending. (Later on, at the end of 1972, serious consideration was 
given  to a fiscal reform that  would  increase  income taxes.  But  the  private 
sector threatened  with  large capital flight. This, in turn, could threaten  the 
constancy of the nominal exchange rate,  something that Echeverria thought 
he had to defend as a sign of  continuing stability and continuity with stabiliz- 
ing  development.)  In  addition,  public  enterprise  prices-which  in Mexico 
must be thought of as an integral part of fiscal policy-were  not changed until 
1973, and only increased in nominal terms. And while real public enterprise 
prices lagged behind, an ambitious program of expansion in public enterprises 
was  begun.28 The deterioration  in public  finances  followed soon (see table 
8.2). 
Strong aggregate demand expansion continued in 1973 and 1974, triggered 
again by deficit spending. With little slack after strong growth in  1972, part 
of this expansion began to be reflected in prices: the inflation rate increased 
from 5% in 1972 to 12% in 1973  and to 23.8% in 1974, significantly in excess 
of  world  inflation.29 Two effects  followed  immediately.  One, as figure 8.1 
25. As opposed to  the past, however, these flows took the form of  commercial hank lending 
rather than bonds or equity investments. Thus, the distribution of risk changed. 
26. An influential report that appeared at that time (Grupo de Estudio del Problema del Ernpleo 
LGEPE], n.d.) argued the existence of a substantial problem of unemployment and underemploy- 
ment in the country, of  the order of 40% of the labor force. See Levy (1979) for a discussion of 
the employment figures in Mexico and Gregory (1986) for a critique of the GEPE figures and an 
alternative view of the functioning of the labor market. 
27. Tax policy was an issue of contention between Echevema and the private sector from the 
very  beginning.  In  December of  1970 Echeverria  sent a small tax reform to Congress (a 1% 
increase in the sales tax rate). The then leader of COPARMEX, an association of private-sector 
businessmen, called on the president to say that this was not the way policy was done, and that tax 
matters had to he negotiated directly with the private sector. 
28. For example, between  1970 and  1972 the real price index for transportation fell by  3%, 
while that of  gasoline and oil by 8%. 
29. As measured by the United States WPI. The relevant inflation figures for that country were 
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Fig. 8.1 
Source: Dornbusch (1988). 
Real exchange rate index (1980 = 100) 
shows, the real exchange rate started to appreciate as the policy of fixing the 
nominal exchange rate was maintained.  Two, as inflation rates exceeded do- 
mestic nominal interest rates, the growth of financial intermediation observed 
during the 1960s began to reverse itself.30 
The expansion of aggregate demand also had an impact on the current ac- 
count. This deficit increased from 0.2% of GDP in 1971 to 3.7% of GDP in 
1974 due to the excess of domestic expenditure over income and the progres- 
sive overvaluation of the exchange rate that began to erode the service com- 
ponent of the current account. These two elements could be tied directly to 
the  government’s  fiscal  stance. A  third element, in  addition,  reflected  the 
long-term structural stagnation of agriculture, which began to exert its toll as 
significant imports of foodstuffs and grains appeared in  1971. The changed 
world environment, however,  modified  the nature of  foreign borrowing ob- 
tained to cover the current account deficits. Now resources came mostly from 
private banks rather than multilateral institutions, with shorter maturities and 
variable interest rates. 
As  of  1972 the government exercised its leading role with a set of macro- 
economic policies that departed from those of the past 15 years. As macroeco- 
nomic  policies changed, so did the government’s rhetoric,  which had to re- 
spond to a private sector witnessing negative domestic real interest rates and a 
progressive overvaluation of the exchange rate. The notions of fiscal prudence 
30. The ratio M3IGNP reached a peak of 0.53 in  1972 and then steadily declined to 0.46 by 
1976. Real interest rates for the last four years of the Echevema sexenio were:  -5.5,  -  12.3, 
-  2.0 and -  33.4; see Solis (198  1). 241  Populism and Economic Policy in Mexico 
Table 8.4  Allocation of Public Social Spending 
% of Public 
Expenditure  % of Public Investment 
Social  Agricultural 
Dates and Administration  Education  Health  Welfare  Education  Health  Development 
193440,  Lazaro Cirdenas 
194W6, M. Avila 
194652,  Miguel Aleman 
1952-58,  A. Ruiz Cortines 
195844,  A. Lopez Mateos 
1964-70,  G. Diaz Ordaz 
197G76, L. Echeverria 
1976-82,  J. Lopez Portillo 
Camacho 
12.5  2.9  9.6  1 .o  I .2 
9.9  3.6  11.1  .2  2.4 
7.8  3.2  13.5  3.0  3.1 
8.7  3.1  14.6  2.6  1.5 
11.4  3.6  24.1  2.7  1.3 
13.2  3.1  24.7  4.8  4.9 
19.4  4.5  22.2  6.6  4.3 









Source: Aspe and Beristain (1984a, p. 26). 
and financial orthodoxy no longer served, so official rhetoric began to rely 
more on “nonorthodox economics.”  31 
On  the other hand, other aspects of  economic policy remained much the 
same as during the stabilizing development. Three merit special attention. 
One, trade policy: the anti-export bias of  the trade regime was  maintained 
despite the fact that fiscal incentives for exports were introduced. No attempt 
was made to liberalize imports. In fact, as the current account deteriorated, 
the  government  responded  with  more  stringent  import  controls,  further 
strengthening the anti-export bias of the trade regime. Two, regional policy: 
to the credit of the administration, an effort was  made to channel more re- 
sources to the rural areas (see table 8.4). But while the share of agriculture in 
total public investment increased from 13.4% in 1970 to 17% in 1974, poli- 
cies that increased the attractiveness of  urban areas continued. Services like 
water and transportation in Mexico City continued to be highly subsidized, 
transferring resources from the rest of  the country into the relatively richer 
capital city.  In addition,  the administration launched an  ambitious housing 
program for urban workers (INFONAVIT). All in all, the urban bias of the 
prior regime continued (Moore  1984). Three,  the exchange rate:  although 
there were strong disagreements in this regard, it was finally decided that the 
policy of keeping a fixed nominal rate would continue, despite expansive fis- 
cal policy and its effects on the trade deficit. It is important to point out that 
the Central Bank supported the fixed exchange rate policy, though perhaps for 
different reasons than those held by the government. 
Negative domestic real interest rates, progressive overvaluation of the real 
3  I. At the beginning of  1973 the minister of  finance (Margain) resigned as a result of  differ- 
ences of opinion with regards to economic policy. 242  Carlos Bazdresch and Santiago Levy 
exchange rate, and growing foreign indebtedness were clear signs of  the un- 
sustainability of the policy stance. As expectations of  an eventual change in 
policy amplified, capital flight began. And although this could be construed 
as a political response to the changed rhetoric, it was  perhaps more simply 
the natural response of asset holders who realized that the option value of  li- 
quid capital abroad, corrected by the expected devaluation, would exceed the 
profitability  of  new  investments in  domestic physical capital or in  peso- 
denominated deposits. In consequence, despite the fact that the economy was 
growing relatively fast and bottlenecks appeared, and that fiscal incentives for 
private investment were granted,32  the latter did not respond as expected. The 
incentive structure had changed, and even if the government was unwilling to 
see its deleterious effects, the same was not true of other agents. 
At the same time, public investment increased (cf. tables 8.5 and 8.6) and, 
along with it, the degree of public intervention in the economy: while a total 
of  83 major public enterprises were  created between  1952 and  1970, the 
equivalent number  for  the  period  1971-76  was  108 (Aspe and  Beristain 
1984a).33  The government also expanded significantly the areas in which it 
operated.  And  while arguments could easily be  found to justify  these ac- 
tion~,~~  we interpret them as the pragmatic response of the government in pur- 
suit of its political interests rather than as a conscious decision to take over the 
role of  the private sector as the main producer of  goods and services (or to 
take the “commanding heights” of the economy). Such a short-term pragmatic 
response, nevertheless, had important implications: the larger role of the gov- 
ernment as producer and investor imposed further burdens on its already over- 
stretched finances and administrative capacity. 
To  put it differently, we argue that by  1973-74  events had  acquired a dy- 
namic of  their own, Rather than following a tightly preconceived plan, the 
government pursued its own objectives through what we might label as “the 
path of least resistance”: a mix of foreign borrowing and inflationary finance. 
Once this  process began,  however, it  created a vicious circle.  Willy-nilly, 
larger budget deficits and increasing devaluation expectations slowed private 
inve~tment.~~  At  the same time,  the political objectives of  the government 
32.  Tell0 (1979, p.  205)  quotes an ex-president of COPARMEX (an association of business 
employers) as follows: “One can assert that few regimes as this one [Echevem’a’s] have been more 
concerned with promoting private initiatives. In just three years, more decrees, laws and regula- 
tions promoting entrepreneurial activity have been passed than during the whole of the prior sex- 
enio” (our translation). In addition, Sigmund (1984) argues that the law regulating direct foreign 
investment,  introduced in  May  1973, requiring a majority of  Mexican participation in all new 
foreign ventures enhanced the strategic position of  Mexican vis-2-vis foreign investors. 
33.  Many of these enterprises, however, were quite small, and included a large number of funds 
and special trusts with little economic impact. 
34. Flores de la Pena, who was minister of national patrimony during the Echeverria regime, 
argues that the Mexico public investment is preferable to private (1976, pp. 35,  41, and 51). 
35.  See Lizondo (1983) on the behavior of future prices for the Mexican peso during that time. 
In terms of  the slowing of  private investment, this was particularly the case after 1974; with the 
exception of that year, the rates of growth of private investment were lower than those of public 
investment for the period under study (see table 8.5). 243  Populism and Economic Policy in Mexico 
Table 8.5  Total Investment (in Constant Prices)' 
Growth  Growth  Growth 
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Sources: SPP, National Accounts 
'In  millions of  1970 pesos. 
called for a larger role in  the economy.  But  as the government  stepped up 
public investment,  it would further deteriorate its financial position, closing 
the  circle: private  investors  would  see growing fiscal deficits together  with 
larger foreign borrowing as unambiguous signals of the unsustainability of the 
macro configuration,  and would wait for events to change with their capital 
safely tucked away abroad. 
The historically  high  inflation  rates of  1973-74  began to  permeate  eco- 
nomic  life.  Investors hedged in foreign assets and real estate; the length of 
contracts shortened:  as of  1973 minimum wages were to be set annually, as 
opposed  to  the  biannual  convention.  Trust  in  the  currency,  which  can be 
thought of as a public good, eroded. The public tried to avoid the inflation tax 
as  a  process  of  currency  substitution  increased  the  share  of  dollar- 
denominated deposits in the total obligations of the financial system from 17% 244  Carlos Bazdresch and Santiago Levy 
Table 8.6  Total Investment (% of GDP) 
Year  Total  Public  Private  Year  Total  Public  Private 
1955  15.5  ...  ...  1972  19.0  6.1  12.9 
1956  17.7  ...  ...  1973  19.3  7.5  11.8 
1957  17.9  ...  ...  1974  19.9  7.5  12.3 
1958  15.7  ...  ...  1975  21.4  5.0  12.4 
1959  15.2  ...  ...  1976  21.0  8.2  12.9 
1960  16.0  ...  ...  1977  19.6  7.8  11.8 
1961  14.8  ...  ...  1978  21.1  9.5  11.6 
I962  14.7  ...  ...  1979  23.4  10.3  13.2 
1963  15.7  ...  ...  1980  24.8  10.7  14.  I 
I964  16.2  ...  ...  1981  26.4  12.1  14.3 
I965  16.6  4.9  11.7  1982  23.0  10.2  12.8 
1966  16.9  5.2  11.7  1983  17.5  6.6  11.0 
1967  18.2  6.5  11.7  1984  17.9  6.6  11.3 
1968  18.2  6.5  11.8  1985  19.1  6.5  12.5 
1969  18.3  6.6  11.7  1986  19.4  6.5  12.9 
I970  20.0  6.6  13.4  1987  18.9  5.5  13.4 
1971  18.0  4.6  13.3 
Sources: Data for 1965-69:  Economia Mexicana en Cifras, NAFINSA (1986). Data for 1970- 
87: Cuentas Nacionales. SPP. 
in 1970 to 40% in 1976 (Solis 1981). In addition to the figures on the current 
account, these were all clear signs of the need for stabilization. And, indeed, 
such a program  was announced: as of  1975 monetary  policy  became  more 
restrictive and a tighter fiscal stance was signaled.36 In fact, and despite the 
absence of a fiscal reform, fiscal revenues began growing quite rapidly due to 
improvements  in the tax collection  system (see table 8.2). But this increase 
arrived too late; public expenditures by then were growing even faster. 
The stabilization  program  did not go far. Efforts at inflation control were 
pursued through, once again, the “path of least resistance”: the exchange rate 
was kept nominally fixed and controls on imports increased, while price con- 
trols were tightened on key commodities provided by public enterprises: the 
resulting implicit subsidies further fed the fiscal deficit. In addition, govern- 
ment spending was not  cut, although  its rate of  growth did slow somewhat 
(see table 8.3): it was argued that inflation would be cut by “increasing sup- 
ply” with more public investment in key bottleneck areas, without recognition 
of  gestation lags, or of the fact that the immediate effect of investment is to 
increase  demand. The inflation  rate fell slightly in  1975, but rose  again in 
1976. As tables 8.2 and 8.7 show, neither the budget nor the current account 
deficit showed any improvement. 
36. The private sector’s beliefs about the viability of  Echeverria’s economic program were also 
influenced by announcements made in  1975 of the discovery of large oil deposits in the south of 
Mexico. These discoveries  would facilitate access to foreign borrowing,  which was needed to 
finance the growing trade deficit. Although capital flight continued,  it did not accelerate at that 
time, an event that gave Echeverna’s program an additional breath of life. 245  Populism and Economic Policy in Mexico 
Table 8.7  Indicators for the External Sector (% of GDP) 
Current 
Total  Oil  Account 
Exports  Exports/  Total  Current  Deficit 
(goods & nfs)  Total  Imports  Account  (in Millions 
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-  5,418.4 
-4,238.5 
-  1,236.7 
1,672.7 
-  3,966.5 
Sources: Indicadores Economicos, Banco de Mexico, and Cuentas Nacionales, SPP. 
Various reasons explain  why the efforts at stabilization in 1975 failed. At 
the technical level there were obvious flaws in trying to “cover up” inflation 
via  higher  subsidies and  an  overvalued  exchange rate.  But  this  probably 
misses the point. The Echeverria administration did not believe in the need for 
stabilization.  To  seriously  attempt to do so would require undoing many of 
the policies (and rhetoric) of  the previous years, since the political inertia of 
the  administration-and  the personal  prestige  of  the  president-was  built 246  Carlos Bazdresch and Santiago Levy 
on the idea of an expanding government with social and infrastructure invest- 
ments. Reversing that inertia was politically difficult. Moreover,  as the basis 
of political support for the government (or the president?) eroded within the 
private sector and some of the middle classes were hurt by inflation, it turned 
to the organized urban working class for political support. Spending cuts and 
a real devaluation would not enhance its standing there. The government had 
cornered itself into an inconsistent set of demands. 
Two factors determined  the final denouement of this process. One, Mexi- 
co’s ample access to international  finance.  Two, the absence of any institu- 
tional mechanism in the Mexican political  system that could counterbalance, 
in the short run, the power of the government. The accommodating variable 
to  the inconsistent  set of demands was foreign borrowing:  the foreign debt 
almost doubled between  1974 and  1976. This was not borrowing to accom- 
modate a temporary downturn  in the terms of trade.  Rather,  it served to  fi- 
nance the large public-sector deficits and, increasingly, capital flight, as the 
government engaged in a forlorn attempt to “defend” the currency. The pro- 
cess came to a halt in September 1976, when the exchange rate, which had 
been nominally fixed since 1954, was devalued by 59%. Faced with no alter- 
natives, with depleted reserves, with inflation of 22%, a foreign debt of $29.5 
billion (U.S. dollars) and rather strained relations with the private  the 
Echevern’a administration terminated with an agreement with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). 
8.4.2  The Lopez Portillo Regime 
The repair  of  strained relations  between  the government  and  the private 
sector was the first order of business for the new administration. The Alliance 
for  Production  was  announced  as the  new  accord  under  which  all  social 
groups would  participate  in the process of economic recovery and political 
healing (under the tutelage of the government,  comme il faut). The rhetoric 
changed  accordingly:  fiscal  prudence  was  (shortly)  in  vogue  again. Thus, 
macroeconomic policy for 1977 was quite orthodox. As table 8.1 shows, GDP 
growth  for that  year  was  the  lowest  in  decades, barely  above  population 
growth. Economic contraction was engineered by classical means: real public 
expenditures and the real money supply fell by 4% and 2%, respectively. The 
current account improved by over $2 billion,  given a sharp drop in imports 
and a mild recovery of exports (see table 8.7). 
Macro policy was carried out under the auspices of the IMF and, as a distin- 
guishing characteristic, brought along changes in trade policy. Imports, 100% 
of which were subject to permits by the end of 1976, were to be liberalized.)* 
37. In  what could perhaps ex post be  seen as a precedent-setting action, the president also 
nationalized  large tracts of land in the northern state of Sonora. The next sexenio would end with 
a similar action but on a larger scale with the nationalization of the domestic banking industry. 
38. It is difficult to determine to what extent the change in trade policy at that time was per- 
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in addition to the intended removal of the domestic bias of the trade regime, 
other reforms were initiated later on. Tax policy was changed, and a value- 
added tax replaced the cascading system of  indirect taxes; additional adjust- 
ments to corporate and personal income taxation followed, although the spe- 
cial tax  treatment granted to  agriculture and transportation continued (Gil 
Diaz 1984, p.  18). We  can speculate: perhaps if oil had not been discovered 
the Mexican economy might have returned to the macro policies of  stabilizing 
development, but with the added lesson that the structural reforms of taxation, 
trade, and regional policy could be postponed no longer. Oil, however, was 
discovered; it changed all. With the benefit of hindsight we can see the unfor- 
tunate event: a temporary terms of  trade improvement in a commodity that 
had  recently been  discovered to be  in abundant supply turned the govern- 
ment’s attention away from structural reforms.39 
Lopez Portillo and his  advisers believed that oil offered “financial self- 
sufficiency” (autodeterminacion financiers)  and  a historical opportunity to 
carry out a “structural transformation” of the economy; the task of the sexenio 
was not to shy away from such opportunity.40  The government, in its role as 
leader, wanted a great leap forward and would, simultaneously, attack many 
problems: from the development of the capital goods industry to the elimina- 
tion of poverty and malnutrition, on to the enlargement of the country’s infra- 
structure, the promotion of  tourism, and the achievement of  self-sufficiency 
in energy and basic grains. And together with the financial resources to do so, 
the government felt, implicitly, that it also had the administrative capability to 
carry it out. 
There was nothing truly novel in the government’s taking such a gigantic 
role in the economy. As discussed, the foundations for substantial government 
participation in the economy were laid in the institutional arrangements of the 
1930s. But there is a second factor that furthered this process connected, if 
we  may  say so, with a political culture that also sees the government as a 
provider. And oil, in this culture, removed any reasons why the government 
should not provide. The outburst of public spending was not the outcome of a 
single individual intoxicated by  a terms of trade shock: it was also produced 
by  a set of institutions that simultaneously placed great expectations on what 
the government should provide and few restraints on the nature of its interven- 
tion in the economy. 
Lopez Portillo and his advisers not only wanted a large public sector; they 
proceeded by  replacing quantitative restrictions and permits by  tariffs, but the process was re- 
versed later on. 
39. Many observers, of  course, saw this danger; e.g.,  Solis (1980, pp. 59-72). 
40. “Either we exploit the oil right now, today, without further delays and infantile fears and 
use it to be truly self-sufficient and sovereign-given,  of course, what our forces and intelligence 
allow-or  soon we will be sorry for not being up to the historical moment that we are living”; 
from the speech given by Diaz Serrano, the general director of PEMEX, on 18 March 1978 (our 
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also wanted an economy that would be immune to the vagaries of  private in- 
vestment. An objective of policy would be to build a public sector capable of 
producing its own  or at least capable of  generating the foreign ex- 
change required to buy these inputs, without running the risk of being “black- 
mailed‘’ by  the private sector. This rather odd idea of  quasi self-sufficiency 
was partly motivated by fears that toward the end of the sexenio the govern- 
ment might face the same kind of economic blackmail (capital flight) experi- 
enced by Eche~erria.~~  In a separate vein, others welcomed the growth of the 
public sector as a step in the direction of socialism (Tell0 1987). 
During the first two years of the oil boom, 1978 and 1979, macroeconomic 
policy was characterized by  strong expansion of aggregate demand, triggered 
by  government expenditures. As table 8.3 shows, the latter grew 13.7% in 
real terms in 1978 and  14.1% in 1979 (and continued to grow at high rates 
through 1981). Yet  inflation, at rates of around 18% for those two years, was 
not accelerating. This was due partly to the opening of  the economy, which 
allowed excess demand to spill more easily into imports. But three additional 
effects were also present. First, agricultural production had a much better per- 
formance, growing on average 4.5% during the Lopez Portillo sexenio versus 
2.6% during Echeverria’s; this reduced some of the inflationary pressures that 
this sector had caused over the last decade.43  Second, private investment re- 
sponded quite positively to the government led expansion in aggregate de- 
mand: it grew by 5.1% in  1978 and by  22.7% in  1979. The official rhetoric 
was different; but, in  addition, a domestic market growing at around 8% an- 
nually offered large profit opportunities at a time in which devaluation risks 
were perceived as minimal given the expected volume of  foreign exchange 
earnings coming from oil. Third, a policy of “price contention” based on con- 
trols on  nominal wages  and  public  enterprise prices was  followed, based 
partly on a (self-serving) belief of complete independence between the infla- 
tion rate, on the one hand, and aggregate demand and the budget deficit on 
the other. 
A second oil shock in late 1979, associated with turbulence in the Middle 
provided a sense of euphoria and affected the psychology of the coun- 
41. A  careful reading of  the Plan Nacional de Desarollo  Industrial reveals the objective of 
building a public sector less dependent on private investment for its inputs. 
42. L6pez Portillo, as any other politician, could mainly explain the events at the end of 1976- 
capital flight and the run on the banks-in  terms of a carefully premeditated aggression on the 
part of organizations acting on behalf of  the private sector. 
43. The relationship between food supply and inflation is an old theme in Latin America. The 
issue is more generally related to the income redistribution that must occur when demand expands 
under an inelastic supply. One of the earliest analysis of  this problem was by the Mexican econo- 
mist Noyola, who argued that inflation was the result of  a “social stalemate” where no group was 
willing or could be forced to absorb an income loss (see Bazdresch 1984). More recently, Cardoso 
(198 1) shows how, under a passive money supply and markup pricing in the manufacturing sector, 
an inelastic supply of food can generate an inflationary process. 
44. In  1979 the Shah of Iran was dethroned; the associated uncertainty produced a temporary 
increase in the world price of oil; see fig. 8.2. 249  Populism and Economic Policy in Mexico 
try, and perhaps the president.  (In fact, the president expressed the view that 
the country’s economic problem was “the management of  abundance.”)  The 
second oil shock further undermined  fiscal discipline as well as attention to 
relative prices. Two factors then account for a substantial increase of the fiscal 
deficit. One, very large projects were undertaken by the government in infra- 
structure,  health  and  nutrition,  and  productive  public  enterprises.  Among 
these, the Mexican Food System (SAM, Sistema Alimentario Mexicano) de- 
serves mention as a very ambitious effort to reduce poverty and improve nutri- 
tion of  lower income groups, while at the same time raising  incomes of  the 
rural poor through guaranteed prices for basic grains. The second factor con- 
cerns the price contention policies for public enterprises which, as noted ear- 
lier, resulted in huge subsidies. 
And while government revenues,  principally  from oil, grew substantially, 
the growth in expenditures-as  table 8.2  and 8.3 show-was  dramatic. Such 
growth further enlarged the range of sectors where the government intervened 
in the economy, provided ample opportunities for graft, and generated large 
inefficiencies  given  the  speed  with which  resources  were being  spent.  But 
more important from a short-term macroeconomic viewpoint, it generated un- 
precedented  deficits in the fiscal and current accounts (tables 8.2 and 8.7). 
The latter account also reflected real exchange rate appreciation, as the rate of 
crawl of  the nominal exchange rate was lower than that of prices  (fig. 8.1). 
Tourism  and border  transactions  lost competitiveness;  merchandise  exports 
actually fell in real terms. The current account deficit jumped from $2.7 bil- 
lion  in  1978 to $16 billion  in  1981, a sixfold increase.  Such an explosive 
growth of  the current account deficit was met by foreign borrowing. Despite 
the positive terms of  trade shock, the foreign debt increased from $36.4 bil- 
lion in 1978 to $74.4  billion in 1981. 
Circumstances began to change in 1981 and did so very rapidly. Economic 
policy was tied to the price of a single commodity.  The short-run effects of 
real exchange rate misalignment and budget deficits could be ignored as long 
as oil resources kept growing.  When the oil market weakened in mid-1981, 
there  was  a realization  that the  increase  in  the price  of oil could be just a 
temporary phenomenon (fig. 8.2).  This, together with the sheer magnitude of 
the underlying macroeconomic disequilibriums and the perspective of change 
that naturally arises when the administration comes to an end, rapidly changed 
the economic  Expectations adjusted rather quickly as the sustain- 
ability of current policies came increasingly into question; capital flight began 
in sizable magnitudes. The timing of events was politically unfortunate; capi- 
tal flight began at the moment when the Lopez Portillo presidency was ending, 
with  only a few months remaining  in the complicated process of  naming a 
45. This is an important side effect of  a political system like the Mexican one, where presidents 
are  barred from reelection. As the end of  the sexenio approaches the current administration may 
fail to internalize fully the medium-term effects of economic policies, thus shortening the planning 
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Fig. 8.2  Real oil price index (1980 = 100) 
Source: Dornbusch (1988). 
successor. The president faced the very situation he hoped to avoid: a negative 
vote of  confidence by the private sector. 
An appropriate response to dramatically changed circumstances was lack- 
ing. The need for adjustment was not in dispute in mid-1981:  the oil boom 
was over and it was time to restore balance to the key macro variables, prin- 
cipally the fiscal stance of the government and the real exchange rate. But the 
measures taken were patently  insufficient to deal with the magnitude of  the 
crisis: the rate of devaluation of  the peso was accelerated somewhat, and most 
of the import controls which had been removed since 1977 were reimposed.46 
As it occurred towards the end of  the Echeverria regime, an attempt was made 
to solve macroeconomic imbalances with a patchy combination of trade policy 
adjustments and noncredible commitments to reduce expenditures.  47 
46. The situation  at  the time generated  a debate centered on whether spending cuts.  a real 
devaluation, or import controls were called for (see, e.g.,  Eatwell and Singh 1982). From our 
point of view, the essence of the problem was a fiscal imbalance which, given private savings and 
investment,  was reflected as a current account deficit. In addition, the exchange rate appeared 
overvalued, and there was little evidence of  excess capacity (Eatwell and Singh 1982 show aver- 
age rates of capacity utilization in the manufacturing sector of over 95%; no data for the non- 
tradable sectors is presented). Import controls would not help with the problem of  exchange rate 
overvaluation; by  cutting a source of supply, they would increase inflationary pressures.  More- 
over, it can be  shown that even in a model that allows for markup pricing and excess capacity, 
import controls in general need not improve the trade deficit, while they will reduce the real wage 
(see Levy 1987). In addition, the use of trade policy to correct macroeconomic imbalances seemed 
inappropriate: it reversed the signals for investment in the exportable sector and probably gener- 
ated an additional surge of imports as consumers anticipated higher obstacles to importing. 
47. In particular, different members of  the cabinet at that time were expressing divergent opin- 
ions on the nature of the crisis and the appropriate policy response. The underlying message was 
that the executive branch was not under full understanding and control of the process. 251  Populism and Economic Policy in Mexico 
The government’s response  to the crisis was based  on various considera- 
tions. First, to them it was not obvious that the fall in the price of oil was not 
a temporary  phenomenon.  Until  they  were convinced that this was not so, 
there was an understandable  reluctance to change direction.  In addition, the 
fact that, at least through the second half of 198  1, foreign commercial banks 
continued to lend to Mexico could also be interpreted as a sign that they also 
saw the fall in the oil price as temporary.  Second, there was perhaps a hope 
that, as in  1976, the American government would come to the rescue.48  And 
while clearly these factors played a role, it is equally true that the political 
voluntarism so characteristic of the Mexican political system strongly pushed 
it against any major attempt at stabilization. 
The ensuing response to the lack of  serious adjustment and the uncertain 
policy signals devastated the Mexican economy. Massive capital flight was the 
private sector’s response to the unsustainable policies.  Yet  at the same time, 
and in the face of a strong speculative attack against the currency, the govern- 
ment decided against any major jump in the exchange rate, maintaining the 
slow rate of crawl. Devaluation and stabilization were seen as equivalent to a 
surrender to its enemies, as these measures implied a substantial  revision of 
the  government’s growth  strategy.  Such backing  down of the powers-to-be 
was an unacceptable situation for any political authority. 
Access to foreign borrowing played again a key role, but with a vengeance. 
Incredibly enough, in a single year, 1981, the country’s foreign debt increased 
from $49 billion to $75 billion, with the bulk of the increase occurring during 
the last six months of the year. Most of this debt was contracted with private 
banks, with relatively  short maturities,  and with variable  interest rates, just 
when world interest rates edged upward and monetary policy tightened in the 
United States. Aprks moi, le deluge. 
The remainder  of  the Lopez Portillo administration was characterized by 
intensely acrimonious relations between the government and the private sec- 
tor. Policy was determined by the need to reduce a fiscal deficit of major pro- 
portions, in a context where the external conditions were now working against 
Mexico: world interest rates were increasing and the oil market weakening. 
At the same time, the supply of  foreign resources turned inelastic as foreign 
creditors realized the magnitude of  Mexico’s obligations and its deteriorated 
economic  conditions.  This combination  of  events  implied  that  foreign bor- 
rowing  was procyclical  with the price of  oil, precisely  the opposite of what 
should occur had there been any attempts at consumption smoothing. 
Faced with the need to change policy, the government needed a new rheto- 
48. We can only speculate why the initial response of the American government to Mexico’s 
crisis, particularly during the first half of  1982, was different to that of  1976. Perhaps this was due 
to the differences in administration (Carter vs. Reagan); perhaps to the fact that in this occasion 
the crisis was of a much larger magnitude (involving other Latin American countries); perhaps 
also the response was due to the previous differences in foreign policy between Mexico and the 
United States, particularly over Nicaragua. It was only later, in August 1982, when there was a 
risk of substantial default with direct repercussions on the large American commercial banks, that 
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ric. It reluctantly had to adjust, but was not quite willing to hear the prescrip- 
tions of  orthodox  macroeconomic management. As  events unfolded  since 
mid-1981, the government turned, as it had  done in the past, to those seg- 
ments of the bureaucracy attuned to a heterodox perspective. But the magni- 
tude of the crisis left almost no room for maneuver, and actions followed ac- 
cordingly: toward the end of  1981 some public-sector prices were raised; in 
early 1982 the government ran out of reserves and could no longer support the 
exchange rate, generating a nominal devaluation of 470%.49  All imports were 
subject to controls, and the rate of growth of public expenditures was reduced 
from 25% in 1981 to 3.7% in 1982. Nominal wage rates were also increased. 
Later a system of  dual exchange rates was announced.s0 Subsequently, in  a 
much-debated action, the president introduced exchange controls and nation- 
alized the domestic banking industry. With depleted reserves, an inflation rate 
of  almost  loo%, a decline in real GDP of  0.5%, a public-sector deficit of 
almost  18% of  GDP and a foreign debt of  $92.4 billion dollars the sexenio 
ended, just like the previous one, by  signing a stabilization program with the 
International Monetary Fund. 
8.5  Concluding Observations 
The sketch of macroeconomic events during 1970-82  presented above pro- 
vides a background against which some further remarks on the nature of “pop- 
ulist economic policies” in Mexico can be made. We  begin by  noting some 
important differences between the two sexenios. First, and most obviously, 
L6pez Portillo’s was blessed with a much larger import capacity. In addition, 
since oil was publicly owned, the revenue position of  the government was 
substantially improved. The underlying circumstances were very different. 
Second and more important, the motives behind policies were different. 
Echeverria’s main objective was to solve a political crisis: larger government 
participation and a reassertion of  control of  the economy were seen as the 
medium through which the crisis would be  solved. This implied an almost 
unavoidable conflict between the government and the private sector. In con- 
trast, at least through the first half of L6pez Portillo’s sexenio, policy could be 
characterized simply as  an  attempt to  “please all,” rather  than  a  situation 
where the interests of the private sector and the government were in conflict. 
Thus, urban workers (or at least their unions) were pleased since even though 
the  real  wage  fell  slightly, employment grew at above-average trends; the 
middle classes were pleased by  price subsidies and an overvalued exchange 
rate; the bureaucracy was pleased by  the greater influence it derived from the 
49. The nominal exchange rate had discrete jumps at various times during 1982. The figure in 
the text is obtained by comparing the December 1981 to December 1982 exchange rate. 
50. Given the emphasis of this paper, and space constraints, we just list here the major events 
during that time. A fuller analysis of  the crisis can be found elsewhere (see Taylor 1985 and 
Bazdresch, n.d., for contrasting views). 253  Populism and Economic Policy in Mexico 
larger involvement of the government in the economy; the private sector was 
pleased by  an overvalued exchange rate and the sizable profits that could be 
made in the domestic market; and rural Mexico was beginning to be pleased 
through large increases in employment, infrastructure investments, and SAM. 
It was only after the crisis erupted, when pleasing all was no longer feasible 
and the situation appeared explosive, that actions that attempted to reassert 
political power and control (exchange controls and bank nationalization) were 
taken. 
A third difference relates to rhetoric. Echeverria’s was quite militant, with 
entrepreneurs being the object of  continuous criticisms. In  contrast, during 
most of  Ldpez Portillo’s regime, the atmosphere of  acrimony and political 
crisis that characterized shared development subsided significantly. Of course, 
after the crisis erupted in mid- 198 1 Ldpez Portillo’s rhetoric changed dramat- 
ically (and rapidly), illustrating the little association that exists between the 
ideological proclivities of the president in turn and populist policies: populist 
policies are not a monopoly of “leftist-leaning’’ presidents (assuming such a 
term is meaningful in Mexico). 
Differences between the two populist episodes notwithstanding, we empha- 
size that, on the whole, they did not result from incompetence, nor from the 
fact that either president did not have technically trained economists among 
their trusted advisers. This does not mean, of course, that some specific pop- 
ulist policies cannot result from mistakes, or from misunderstandings of  the 
nature of  markets or  of the type of  interventions that can increase welfare. 
Economics is not an exact science, and there is plenty of room for error and 
differences of opinions. In addition, ideology matters; sometimes the rejection 
of the distributional implications of undiluted markets leads some economists 
to reject tools of  analysis that emphasize the allocative role of prices; para- 
phrasing Sheahan (see n. 3 above), rejection of  efficiency criteria becomes a 
principle.  I 
But there is a wide gap between, on the one hand, individual populist poli- 
cies that may arise from policy mistakes and, on the other hand, the system- 
atic violation of economywide budget constraints and the persistence of gov- 
ernment interventions against the logic of  markets. While certainly mistakes 
matter (and are difficult to correct given inertia, vested interests, and pres- 
tige), the appearance of  populist episodes under very different circumstances 
shows that other factors play a more central role. Our argument is that populist 
episodes are, at heart, the results of circumstances where policymakers be- 
5 1. We note also that in rejecting tools of analysis that emphasize the importance of markets, 
policymakers create a vicious circle: the measures introduced end up strengthening monopolies 
and distorting prices further, then proving, ex post facto, that markets lead to undesirable out- 
comes. As an example, consider the issue of industrial policy. Many analysts have pointed out the 
oligopolistic  structure of some sectors of  manufacturing, with obvious welfare costs. Yet at  the 
same time the same analysts will recommend import controls and other trade barriers that, among 
their many  effects, certainly promote  oligopolistic  concentration in  industry  (see Cordera and 
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lieve that their political  goals can only be achieved by interventions that re- 
strict the operation of markets and increased the degree of state intervention. 
From Echeverria’s perspective, how else but with a return to the state was he 
going to convince left-wing intellectuals to abandon violent means? From Lo- 
pez Portillo’s perspective, how else but with exchange controls and bank na- 
tionalization was he to “punish” the private sector for capital flight and reas- 
sert the primacy of the government in the economy? 
We posit that while distributional  considerations  are important  (given the 
government’s role as “referee of social conflict”), populist episodes are a re- 
flection of  a deeper phenomenon: the underlying  weakness  of  governments 
who engage in populist policies because, so to speak, they have no other cards 
to play. Under our interpretation, therefore, populist episodes in Mexico occur 
when the government engages in “last-resort”  policies  that it  believes will 
strengthen it. These policies  can be deficit  finance that  results  partly  from 
pursuing some distributional  objectives and partly larger influence through a 
greater presence and control of economic activity (as was most often the case 
with  Echeverria);  but they can also be policies  that have no direct distribu- 
tional objective but rather try to tilt the balance of power in favor of the gov- 
ernment (as was the case with Lopez Portillo’s bank nationalization). 
From a strictly technical point of  view, the case against populist policies is 
simple and overwhelming: because they ignore the reaction of agents to the 
incentive  structure, and the underlying  resource  constraints, they cannot be 
sustained. And, moreover,  when the short-term  economic benefits that they 
can potentially  yield are exhausted, the unavoidable correction  that  follows 
has economic costs that erode the  initial  economic gains;  in  present  value 
terms, populist policies are welfare reducing. 
But  policies  must  be evaluated  by their ability to reach their  underlying 
objectives. If populist episodes occur partly as a result of the weakness of the 
government, an important metric (though not  the only  one) for evaluating 
them must be their effectiveness in strengthening the government or solving 
the political  crisis which was their initial raison  d’etre.52  Thus, as shown in 
section 8.4, there is no doubt that Echeverria’s and Lopez Portillo’s regimes 
faired badly in the economic front; the dynamic equilibrium which had been 
so carefully preserved  during stabilizing development was  But during 
Echeverria’s regime there  were  some notable  improvements  in the political 
front. Though hesitantly, the door was opened for extensive political reforms, 
political repression  became a thing of  the past, a potentially dangerous guer- 
rilla movement was diffused, freedom of the press was established. With the 
beginning  of the dismantling of the closed corporate political system of  the 
52. From this  perspective,  orthodox  economists  who criticize populist governments on  the 
grounds that the same distributional  objectives that those governments claim to pursue can be 
achieved at lower cost and/or by more efficient means, while technically correct, may be missing 
the point. 
53. To  this day, policymakers are still struggling to lower the inflation rate and raise the growth 
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fifties and sixties, Mexico initiated a transformation toward a politically plural 
society. Echeverria was a key element in this process. 
With Lopez Portillo the situation  is also mixed.  There was a substantial 
political reform that consolidated Echeverria’s initial moves toward a less re- 
pressive  state;  political  parties  on  the  left  were  legalized.  This  certainly 
strengthened civil society. On the other hand, and perhaps paradoxically, Lo- 
pez Portillo’s populism failed to reach its political objectives, as the huge debt 
buildup,  the  bank  nationalization,  and  the  exchange  controls  did  not 
strengthen but instead further weakened the government.  Strength cannot de- 
rive from the inheritance of a huge public debt, a financial sector that escapes 
government control as banks reduce their importance as financial intermedi- 
aries, while  foreign exchange transactions  continue unabated.54 And  while 
distributional considerations were obviously not the motives for these actions, 
it is clear that  (i) the poor people in Mexico did not benefit from them,55 and 
(ii) the poor have borne, at least in absolute terms, the economic costs of  the 
unavoidable adjustment to the large macroeconomic disequilibriums. 
We  thus find  that  populist  policies,  aside from their  obvious economic 
shortcomings, generally fail  to strengthen  the government.  And,  after  the 
populist  episode comes to an end, the economic incentives required  to in- 
crease private  investment  are larger,  as investors  require  higher  returns  to 
compensate for the observed uncertainty  and higher risks.  The use of  eco- 
nomic policy to pursue the short-term political interests of the government is 
hence doubly costly; not only do the episodes end in a need for macroeco- 
nomic  stabilization, but  the underlying  increase  in generalized  uncertainty 
acts like a tax on new  investment, which depresses the prospects  for long- 
term growth. 
Given their undesirable welfare consequences, how can populist episodes 
be avoided? The answer is complex, but we feel that two elements must play 
a dominant role. First, civil society-the  set of nongovernment  institutions 
that  together with  the central  government bureaucracy  shape the nation- 
54. Proponents of exchange controls (see Tell0 1987) argued that controls would give more 
“degrees of freedom” to economic policy by delinking the domestic interest rate from the foreign 
and allowing the government to pursue more aggressive tax reforms without the fear of capital 
flight. The nationalization  of  the banks was then required to help implement the said controls 
(while at the same time reducing the political power of the “financial sector”). As one of us has 
argued elsewhere, however, these arguments are unconvincing (Bazdresch 1985).  Given Mexico’s 
proximity to the United States, exchange controls would not serve to reduce the mobility of capi- 
tal. As a result, if  domestic savings were to be kept in the domestic financial system, exchange 
controls would not succeed in delinking the domestic rate of interest from the world rate of inter- 
est. It is not obvious, moreover, how proponents of exchange controls would set domestic interest 
rates even if  the economy was closed to capital movements: the point here is that the interest rate 
is an intertemporal price that plays a key role in distributing consumption through time and cannot 
be set independently of agents preferences. 
55.  Moreover, some policies associated with the bank nationalization were certainly regressive. 
While the nominal exchange rate was set at 70.00 pesos per dollar, a special exchange rate of 
50.00 pesos per dollar was instituted for firms with dollar-denominated debts (so as to “protect” 
the productive apparatus). This created the need for significant subsidies to cover the losses by the 
Central  Bank  on  this  type  of  operations.  But,  clearly,  not  many  poor  people  had  dollar- 
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must be  strengthened. The government has, at present, too much room for 
arbitrary actions (either repressing the population as did Diaz Ordaz or sud- 
denly nationalizing the private banks as did L6pez Portillo). To  some extent, 
the protagonistic role played by  the government must be diminished. Upon 
reflection,  it should be  clear that  strengthening civil society will,  in turn, 
strengthen the government, because the latter will then have a legitimate man- 
date from the former to carry out reforms. And while a “strong” government 
is an operationally difficult concept, we  mean by  this a situation where the 
government has, among other things, the ability to decree and enforce reason- 
able tax structures, to develop institutional settings where conflicts are settled 
by law, and where there is no need to make unsustainable promises or engage 
in special deals with specific groups to obtain legitimacy and support. If pop- 
ulist episodes occur when governments have no further cards to play,  then 
strong governments might not feel the need for populist policies or may be 
able to correct them before they produce long-term damages. But, more im- 
portant, under a strengthened civil society governments will not have the pos- 
sibility to lead the country into populist economic episodes. 
The second element concerns the social perception about market-oriented 
policies. The fact that societies allow governments to pursue policies that sys- 
tematically go against the logic of  markets reflects the fact that they are not 
fully convinced about their benefits. As we have argued, there are substantial 
reasons why this has been so in Mexico. We are convinced that, on the whole, 
market-oriented policies are desirable and beneficial; there seems to be  no 
other mechanism to produce an efficient allocation of  resources. And  yet, 
while markets do produce relatively more efficient outcomes than direct gov- 
ernment allocations, efficiency is not enough. Market outcomes must also be 
distributionally acceptable. 
Developing a social consensus in favor of market-oriented policies is also 
important. To  do this,  not only must the benefits of  markets become clear, 
particularly the associated distribution of  income, but the conditions under 
which markets do indeed produce better outcomes also requires elucidation: 
markets have desirable properties under a certain set of  conditions. At  the 
same time, however, we must also come to realize that while certain market 
outcomes may not be Pareto efficient, this need not imply that the situation 
can be  improved by  government action. It is necessary to understand that, 
given problems of bounded rationality, availability of information, and incen- 
tive  compatibility, there  are  limits  to  what  government interventions can 
achieve, even if ~ell-intentioned.~~  In addition, the implicit connection that is 
made between markets and privilege must di~appear.~’ 
56. A case in point is the market for credit. It is now generally understood that credit rationing 
may arise even in contexts where the interest rate is free to vary (Stiglitz 1988). But the root of the 
problem is a moral hazard problem arising from the fact that information is asymmetric and costly. 
This type of informational failure, however, cannot generally be solved by governments. 
57. Language is revealing about this problem in Mexico: the term private sector (or, mislead- 
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Market-oriented policies will produce benefits when they are perceived by 
all agents to be permanent. There is now  a substantial body of  literature to 
show that noncredible or unsustainable market reforms may  reduce welfare 
and, in doing so, reduce the reputation of markets. From a different perspec- 
tive, imposing a market-oriented outcome may, to some extent, be sowing the 
seeds for a latter populist episode. The permanency of market-oriented poli- 
cies is thus directly linked to the social consensus behind them. If  the latter is 
developed, the associated economic outcome, while obviously not a Pareto 
optimum, is likely nonetheless to be better than the current situation. But, of 
course, a Pareto optimum, or anything coming closer to that, might not be 
what society desires. The arguments of  the “social welfare function” might 
include elements other than physical goods. Society has the right to choose an 
alternative set of  policies-as  long as it is aware of  the associated economic 
costs of those policies. 
But the lesson from all this must be obtained by  looking not only at Eche- 
verria’s and L6pez Portillo’s regimes, but also at stabilizing development. Sta- 
bilizing development can be criticized for paying scant attention to political 
development. Echeverria probably tried to redress the balance by focusing on 
political development, although in doing so he, in turn, paid scant attention to 
economic constraints.  Neither strategy, in the end, was permanent.  So  the 
lesson is simply that societies cannot develop under either a purely economic 
or political track. One cannot focus only on one set of variables at the expense 
of the other, and perhaps Mexico has been suffering, since at least the 1950s, 
from wide swings in a pendulum that goes from concentration in economic 
matters at the expense of political development to concentration in economic 
development at the expense of  politics. Populism is, from this perspective, 
just one of the two types of errors that policymakers can fall into. 
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CorIlment  Enrique Cardenas 
Bazdresch and  Levy’s paper  is a well-structured  and researched  piece that 
deals with the economy’s development from the late 1950s until the crisis of 
1982. The authors also review briefly the immediate postrevolutionary  years 
and emphasize the role of the revolutionary ideology as the seed of subsequent 
populist periods that have repeated themselves sporadically.  However, they 
review very deeply the policies of the Echeverria (1970-76)  and Lopez Por- 
tillo (1  976-82)  administrations. 
The first part intends to demonstrate that the revolution ideology created a 
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strong, interventionist,  and large state with the power to influence and direct 
economic activity. In my view, although this is true to some degree-the  1917 
Constitution that emanated from the revolution  included many economic ar- 
ticles  along  those  lines-the  Mexican  state “developed”  its  instruments  of 
economic policy  at about the same time as most other countries: during the 
1930s. Indeed, in the 1920s, the Mexican government had as its only policy 
expedient the import tariff to affect relative prices; by the mid-l930s, the re- 
cently created Central Bank  began to function as a real monetary authority, 
and fiscal policy began to be implemented very cautiously to counteract eco- 
nomic recessions. But all this was happening at the same time in all the major 
Latin American countries. Indeed, it is usually argued that the Great Depres- 
sion throughout Latin America and elsewhere was the major force behind the 
idea of  an interventionist government.  This was not only through  economic 
policy; the general atmosphere pointed in that direction. 
The authors also consider that in contemporary Mexico there were two epi- 
sodes of populist polices: Ckdenas and Echeverria-Lopez  Portillo.  I have 
no doubt that  they  are right,  but  I  would only mention that Ckdenas was 
careful not to ignore the macro constraints that his successors did. During the 
most expansionist  years of the Ckdenas period, the fiscal deficit was about 
I%  or 2%  of GDP. During the Echeverria period the deficit reached  10% of 
GDP, while during the Lopez Portillo administration, the fiscal deficit reached 
a peak of almost 17% of GDP. Naturally, Echeverria and Lopez Portillo would 
love to be placed  in the same package as Cfirdenas, but I do not think that 
should be the case. 
With regard to the stabilizing development period, the authors follow the 
mainstream,  noting that fiscal discipline was the reason that inflation and the 
nominal  exchange rate were stable during those years.  I firmly believe they 
are right, but that this was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for such 
an  outcome. New  research  has recently  shown that the  absence  of  foreign 
shocks also played a significant role in that respect. That is to say, “stabilizing 
development” was possible because the government was well disciplined in 
its finances and because there were no external shocks that disturbed the econ- 
omy during that period. 
Their approach to analyzing the 1970-82  years is by reviewing the various 
economic policies  undertaken  by  those regimes.  The authors conclude that 
these governments  adopted populist  policies to reach high-priority  political 
objectives that, moreover, could not be reached through market-oriented inter- 
ventions. They arrive at this conclusion by saying that Echeverria had no other 
choice than to increase the role of the state in the economy if  he wished to 
attract the support of leftist intellectuals. However, when they review that pe- 
riod, they imply that the failure of Echeverria, as measured by the 1976 crisis, 
was largely due to his lack of fiscal discipline as well  as to the  pernicious 
interplay of foreign economic shocks, such as the oil embargo and high inter- 
national inflation rates. This fact, with which I personally  agree, points to a 
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ical  reasons  of  high  priority,  which  tend to benefit  a specific  social group, 
sometimes at the expense of another. But what is equally true and important 
is that  a populist  regime is not  willing to pay the whole cost of  its policy. 
Echeverria, for instance, decided to redistribute wealth and enlarge the size of 
the state by spending resources that he actually did not have and was unwilling 
to make thejiscal reforms that would provide such funds. If he had done so, 
there would be a discussion on ideology (having a large vs. a small state) and 
not a discussion on populism. The consequence of that decision had disastrous 
effects, as Bazdresch and Levy well point out, which could have been avoided 
or at least could have served to turn the public’s attention to the basic underlin- 
ing factor: the weak structure of  the economy. 
Such an unwillingness to “pay the price” is also a reflection of a basic ingre- 
dient of populist policies: The utmost concern for the short run as opposed to 
the long term. Naturally, political objectives usually imply, at the end, the aim 
to control power. In modem regimes, holding power (and political prestige) is 
a concern for just a few years, especially in a nonrenewable six year term that 
the president  serves in Mexico. In other cases, such a term is even shorter. 
Consequently, political objectives are usually concerned with the short term, 
and therefore populist policies are also usually concerned with immediate im- 
pact. That is why it is not difficult to understand why populist regimes are not 
prepared to pay the whole price and tend to overlook the macroeconomic con- 
straints that any economy faces. 
In the case of Echeverria, if he had made the fiscal reforms needed to pay 
for the additional expenditures required to pursue his political objectives, it is 
possible to speculate that the crisis would have arrived anyway, probably later. 
It would have come, however,  not because of fiscal indiscipline but because 
the structure of the economy remained weak, uncompetitive,  and highly vul- 
nerable to external economic shocks, which  were particularly  strong in the 
1970s. 
Lopez Portillo’s populism, I believe,  is of  a different sort. He was blessed 
with the oil boom and a tremendous inflow of foreign exchange. At first the 
government thought that it had  finally  overcome its endemic financial con- 
straint that the scarcity of hard currency imposes on the balance of payments. 
During its first years, the L6pez Portillo regime simply wanted to distribute 
wealth that was pouring from the oil revenues, not necessarily redistribute it. 
JosC  Lopez Portillo’s populism  was for the poor and the rich. There was so 
much wealth that it seemed that there was enough for everybody. All enjoyed 
inexpensive public goods and services, cheap dollars, and extensive subsidies 
at all levels. It was like manna coming from heaven, but it became the virus 
of a “Dutch disease” type of macroeconomic problem. The sudden inflow of 
vast amounts of  dollars distorted  relative prices and increased income. The 
result was a growing import bias and high domestic rates of  inflation, which 
exerted pressure on the balance of  payments, given a fixed exchange rate pol- 
icy.  Consequently,  the  economy’s structure became  even  weaker  and  more 
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It should be mentioned that, during Lopez Portillo’s regime, a segment of 
the government tried to enter the GATT in an attempt to force the economy to 
become more efficient and competitive. The impact of the Dutch disease was 
beginning to be felt, and concern was expressed in terms of the disastrous 
macroeconomic outcome if the status quo were maintained. The refusal to join 
GATT was a reflection of a generalized feeling of self-sufficiency, not only in 
the executive branch but also in most of the private sector. At the same time, 
there was no government recognition of the fact that the economy was becom- 
ing weaker. 
Actually, it can be speculated that, if the price of oil had continued to climb 
as was forecasted  by  most  analysts at the time,  and  assuming that overall 
macroeconomic policy would have continued the way it was, the Dutch dis- 
ease would have become a cancer and a larger segment of the society would 
become a rentier class, very much in the same way the Spaniards in the six- 
teenth century were affected by the gold and silver inflows from their Ameri- 
can colonies. Income was growing much faster than actual productivity, and 
the  relative price  increase  of  domestically produced  goods with  relatively 
open imports inhibited domestic investment on productive activities. To allow 
such a situation, with the concomitant impact in public finances and the bud- 
getary deficit, was another form of populism.  To make people believe that 
they were rich (because they truly believed it) when they actually are not is a 
certain way to spoil one’s future. 
The authors rightly  argue that  in order to “immunize” a country against 
populist policies it is necessary to strengthen the role of the civil society and 
to create a social consensus in favor of economic policies that do not clash 
directly with the logic of markets. They also indicate, with good reason, that 
it is important that institutions should be created in order to prevent a govern- 
ment from ignoring macroeconomic constraints. I would simply extend this 
thought to mention that governments and the “social consensus” alike must 
not forget that it is  impossible to obtain something from nothing, that one 
cannot indefinitely consume more than what one produces, that a country can- 
not live from borrowing forever. Perhaps this is the most painful lesson that 
Mexico has  learned from the recent economic crisis, a lesson  that  is now 
shared by the government and the common people alike. This is another kind 
of immunization, at least for one generation, I hope; that is, just having the 
disease. 
Indeed, the prolonged crisis and the more recent opening of the economy to 
foreign competition has had a tremendous impact on people’s mentality. Ap- 
parently governments learn and people also learn. In my opinion, there is a 
growing and widespread feeling today, at least among the middle and upper 
classes, that one has to be more productive and competitive in order to enjoy 
a better life, that it is no longer possible to spend beyond one’s means indefi- 
nitely. 